History of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. History of the disaster

These days, thirty years ago in 1988, events began to take place in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan that formed the basis of a long-term conflict, which today is referred to as the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. Despite the passage of time, the events of that period are still the subject of keen interest and the subject of heated debate.

On April 4, Generals Vladislav Safonov and Kamil Mamedov spoke at the Sputnik Azerbaijan multimedia press center about how the conflict developed and how, under these conditions, it was possible to ensure control over the operational situation.

As noted in the press release of the Caucasus History Center received by Day.Az, prepared on the basis of materials from Sputnik Azerbaijan, with the personal participation of Vladislav Safonov and Kamil Mamedov, it was possible to ensure relative stability in Karabakh and avoid much bloodshed in the initial stages of the conflict until the collapse of the USSR.

The event was attended by the first commandant of the special situation region of NKAO (Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region of the Azerbaijan SSR), Major General Vladislav Safonov, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs for Police and Operations (in 1981-1989), Major General Kamil Mamedov, as well as the director Center for the History of the Caucasus, senior researcher at the Institute of Law and Human Rights of the National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan Rizvan Huseynov.

The first commandant of the special situation region of NKAO was Major General Vladislav Safonov, now living in Russia. He held this position from May 1988 to December 1990. With Safonov’s personal participation, in a very difficult situation, it was possible to ensure relative stability and avoid major bloodshed. From the very beginning of the conflict in 1988, Major General Kamil Mamedov was also sent to Karabakh, who, as a high-ranking officer, made a great contribution to the defense of Azerbaijani lands from Armenian occupation.

V. Safonov revealed the details of the meeting in Nagorno-Karabakh with State Duma deputy of the second convocation Galina Starovoytova, who called him the “Karabakh Pinochet.”

The spark that led to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was the approaching collapse of the USSR, believes V. Safonov. According to him, everyone believes that Karabakh was a testing ground for the collapse of the Soviet Union.

“In Karabakh they practiced whether the authorities would stand it or not. Everything that happened there was due to the impotence of not only the authorities of the Soviet Union, but also the republican authorities,” Safonov noted.

Major General Vladislav Safonov also spoke about the situation that prevailed in Karabakh at the very beginning of the conflict. The spark that led to the flare-up of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was the approaching collapse of the USSR. According to him, until December 1990, Khankendi (formerly Stepanakert) and surrounding areas were cleared of all gangs, operations were carried out to confiscate weapons and foreign uniforms.

“When the national economic congress was held in Stepanakert (Khankendi - ed.), the territory was free for everyone. People from all regions of Azerbaijan went there and watched. I was afraid that order might be disrupted there, but the territory was free,” Safonov noted.

The general noted that the approaching collapse of the USSR served as a flashpoint for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: “Karabakh was a kind of testing zone where it was tested whether the state would survive. During my tenure as commandant, three presidents were replaced. In Karabakh, the chairman of the KGB was also replaced - he became Evgeniy Voiko. When reinforcements were sent from Baku, we tried to settle everything."

"Five people's deputies from the Armenian SSR, including Z. Balayan, worked to disrupt order, I regularly received complaints and letters about them. At our request, a decision was made to isolate them. The Alpha group compiled a corresponding list. We sat and waited, when the head gives his consent, but the order was never received,” said the major general.

In turn, Major General Kamil Mamedov noted that the Karabakh events began on February 12, 1988: “We could never imagine that such a situation could arise. Baku has always been a hospitable city. Armenians, Georgians, and Azerbaijanis lived here ", both Jews and Russians. No one has ever divided anyone by nationality. Each nation believed in its own God, but obeyed the law." Kamil Mamedov, in turn, noted that the pain of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will continue until we finally resolve this issue.

According to him, the events in Karabakh began on February 12, 1988, more than 30 years have passed since then: “We were told that the main reason for the secession of Karabakh was that the standard of living there was very low. The separatist forces were interested in this. But We have documents that prove that the standard of living in Karabakh was much higher than in general in Azerbaijan or Armenia."

The general said that he arrived in Karabakh in the very first days of the conflict - February 13, 1988. On that day, a crowd of about two to three hundred people gathered in the square between the district committee and the regional executive committee. And everyone chanted "miatsum". They demanded separation from Azerbaijan and “reunification” with Armenia.

“It was all incomprehensible to me then. We were not ready for such a situation. I then reported to Baku that the Armenian population of Karabakh was hostile, they demanded “reunification” with Armenia. And the reason for this, according to them, is the low standard of living in Karabakh. This was the main argument on which the Armenian side relied then,” he said.

During the press conference, Mamedov also showed those present a number of documents and newspaper clippings dedicated to the Karabakh events. In addition, the major general introduced journalists to a map that he had seized from an Armenian prisoner of war in those years.

This map of “Great Armenia” from sea to sea” indicates the long-standing dream of Armenian nationalists - “Armenia from sea to sea,” which included Tbilisi, Baku, and many other lands.

“In a small square in the center of Khankendi, 200-300 Armenian separatists chanted the slogan “miatsum” with a demand to annex the NKAO to the Armenian SSR. I reported to Baku about the difficult situation here and was ready, through the special police detachment under my command, to resolve the issue at its root. I developed a plan to arrest all the instigators of the rally and other separatists in Khankendi, but from Baku, the second secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan V. Konovalov ordered me not to use force and threatened to put me on trial if I did this. He argued that the center itself would decide this question peacefully, but this did not happen, and the chance to crush Armenian separatism in the bud was missed,” K. Mamedov shared his memories.

Then General V. Safonov took the floor, who added to what was said that in Karabakh at that time the population was about 167 thousand people, among whom only 20% were Azerbaijanis. And the standard of living in Karabakh was quite good at that time. But the fact is that most of these 20% of Azerbaijanis who were there lived not in Khankendi itself, but outside it, in villages. According to him, it was these people who had very difficult conditions. It was an almost primitive way of life. He said that people lived practically in dugouts, so squalid and miserable that it shocked visitors.

“That’s why I later took the leadership to these villages to show how poor Azerbaijanis live. So that they could see with their own eyes who is poor in Nagorno-Karabakh. Mutalibov even came there three times,” Safonov said.

The Russian general told reporters about the terrible events in Karabakh, as well as why he left his post as commandant in Karabakh. The upper echelons of the Soviet and Azerbaijani authorities did not make the right decision on the situation in Shusha, said Vladislav Safonov. He said that he left Karabakh on December 12, 1990. According to him, until 1991, the territory of Khankendi and other territories adjacent to it were basically cleared of Armenian gangs. And no military or provocative speeches were allowed there.

“We carried out operations to open caches of weapons and ammunition, weapons and military uniforms were confiscated from the local population. Among all this there were also foreign weapons,” he said.

The general also said that Viktor Polyanichko, who then headed the special management committee and, according to Safonov, was not sufficiently appreciated in Azerbaijan, held events of a republican scale in Khankendi. For example, a congress of workers in agriculture, railway transport, and so on was held there. That is, people came to Khankendi from all regions of Azerbaijan. According to him, the arriving people walked everywhere: “For me it was a big headache, because I was afraid of provocations. Well, the visiting people were interested in everything, they walked everywhere, looked at how the situation was. So this territory was absolutely free , everyone could move freely."

According to Safonov, Yerevan emissaries were also sent to Karabakh at that time. Among them were people's deputies from Karabakh, including Zoriy Balayan, who carried out work there to disintegrate the existing system and order. The general said that these people wrote complaints to the commandant, about which he then had to report twice to the boards of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. And explain who contributed to nationalism, incitement, incitement and bloodshed.

Safonov, answering questions from journalists about why he was nicknamed “The Rock General” or “Iron General” in Karabakh, said that he was so nicknamed because he did not try to be disingenuous and, in difficult circumstances, did what was prescribed by the law and regulations. That is, strictly follow what was prescribed to the commandants. "Some tried to play along with someone somewhere. I strictly followed the law. I strictly asked for compliance with instructions and, regardless of the political color that was presented, I did what was prescribed, and most importantly, prescribed by the Constitution. Indivisibility, unity of territories each republic and the Soviet Union as a whole is an indestructible thing. And no matter how they tried to historically justify that Nagorno-Karabakh belongs not to Azerbaijan, but to Armenia, I did not pay attention to this," the general emphasized.

Safonov also said that at the request of him and his team, the deputy chairman of the KGB of the USSR, a decision was made to isolate persons engaged in obvious anti-Soviet activities. The Alpha group even came to Karabakh for this purpose.

“We waited three or four days, not allowing any leaks about our plans. We waited for consent to come down from above for this operation. There was no consent,” he said.

According to the general, his dismissal was due both to the presence of a large number of spiteful critics and to the fact that one man in the field is not a warrior. He told how, before leaving Karabakh in December 1990, he spoke at a meeting of the Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan. During his speech, Safonov brought to the attention of the listeners all the intelligence data about how the Armenian side is preparing, what mobilized formations they have, what weapons and equipment they have.

“I gave out the entire complete intelligence report at that meeting, which was also attended by the then president of the country Ayaz Mutalibov. But I also said that the Azerbaijani side is not preparing for resistance at all,” he emphasized.

The general also touched upon Shushi in his speech at the conference. According to him, then he and his team were active supporters of the Azerbaijanis - refugees from Yerevan placed in Baku - receiving land in these territories. And they called for help for these people so that they could build houses and arrange their lives. At the same time, according to Safonov, they advocated for protection for these families there. But this was not done for the families who arrived in Shusha; no additional units were sent. Since then the Minister of Internal Affairs Mamed Asadov relied on the newly created riot police units.

“He assured that all the issues would be resolved. And I then warned that they would not help in any way, that these guys were cannon fodder. But in the upper echelons no other decision was made. And further events that followed after my departure showed themselves that that nothing can be done on patriotism and desire alone. Professional training is needed," concluded Safonov.

The conference ended with a speech by the director of the Caucasus History Center, Rizvan Huseynov, who recalled that these days marked two years since the April 2016 battles. According to him, in those days the Azerbaijani army achieved some success. Some territories of Azerbaijan were liberated from occupation.

“The Azerbaijani army carried out a large-scale offensive with new forces. If in the 90s there was a completely different preparation, now we have seen a synthesis of the old military school with the new,” he said.

R. Huseynov noted that foreign experts, including Russian military specialists, noted that the April battles showed the high morale of the Azerbaijani army and the courage of ordinary soldiers and officers. Also, the April battles made it possible to draw attention to some shortcomings and weaknesses in actions on the battlefield. The April events changed both the negotiation process and the philosophy of the Armenian side’s understanding of what their “miatsum” turned out to be thirty years later,” Huseynov concluded.

Nagorno-Karabakh (Armenians prefer to use the ancient name Artsakh) is a small territory in Transcaucasia. Mountains cut by deep gorges, turning into valleys in the east, small fast rivers, forests below and steppes higher up the mountain slopes, a cool climate without sudden temperature changes. Since ancient times, this territory was inhabited by Armenians, was part of various Armenian states and principalities, and there are numerous monuments of Armenian history and culture on its territory.

At the same time, since the 18th century, a significant Turkic population has penetrated here (the term “Azerbaijanis” had not yet been accepted), the territory is part of the Karabakh Khanate, which was ruled by a Turkic dynasty, and the majority of the population were Muslim Turks.

In the first half of the 19th century, as a result of wars with Turkey, Persia and individual khanates, the entire Transcaucasus, including Nagorno-Karabakh, went to Russia. Somewhat later it was divided into provinces without taking into account ethnicity. Thus, at the beginning of the 20th century, Nagorno-Karabakh was part of the Elizavetpol province, most of which was inhabited by Azerbaijanis.

By 1918, the Russian Empire collapsed as a result of well-known revolutionary events. Transcaucasia became the arena of bloody interethnic struggle, which was restrained for the time being by the Russian authorities (It is worth noting that during the previous weakening of imperial power during the revolution of 1905-1907, Karabakh had already become an arena of clashes between Armenians and Azerbaijanis.). The newly formed state of Azerbaijan laid claim to the entire territory of the former Elizavetpol province. The Armenians, who formed the majority in Nagorno-Karabakh, wanted either to be independent or to join the Armenian Republic. The situation was accompanied by military clashes. Even when both states, Armenia and Azerbaijan, became Soviet republics, the territorial dispute between them continued. It was decided in favor of Azerbaijan, but with reservations: most of the territories with an Armenian population were allocated to the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAO) as part of the Azerbaijan SSR. The reasons why the Union leadership made this decision are unclear. Assumptions include the influence of Turkey (in favor of Azerbaijan), the greater influence of the Azerbaijani “lobby” in the union leadership compared to the Armenian one, Moscow’s desire to maintain a hotbed of tension in order to act as the supreme arbiter, etc.

In Soviet times, the conflict quietly smoldered, breaking through either through petitions from the Armenian public for the transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, or through measures of the Azerbaijani leadership to creepingly oust the Armenian population from the areas adjacent to the autonomous region. The abscess broke out as soon as the union power weakened during “perestroika”.

The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh became significant for the Soviet Union. It clearly showed the growing helplessness of the central leadership. He demonstrated for the first time that the Union, which seemed indestructible in accordance with the words of its anthem, could be destroyed. In some ways, it was the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that became the catalyst for the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, its significance extends far beyond the region. It is difficult to say what path the history of the USSR, and therefore the whole world, would have taken if Moscow had found the strength to quickly resolve this dispute.

The conflict began in 1987 with mass rallies of the Armenian population under the slogans of reunification with Armenia. The Azerbaijani leadership, with the support of the Union, unequivocally rejects these demands. Attempts to resolve the situation boil down to holding meetings and issuing documents. In the same year, the first Azerbaijani refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh appeared. In 1988, the first blood was shed - two Azerbaijanis died in a clash with Armenians and the police in the village of Askeran. Information about this incident leads to an Armenian pogrom in Azerbaijani Sumgait. This is the first case of mass ethnic violence in the Soviet Union in several decades and the first sound of the death bell for Soviet unity. Then the violence increases, the flow of refugees from both sides increases. The central government demonstrates helplessness; making real decisions is left to the republican authorities. The actions of the latter (deportations of the Armenian population and the economic blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan, the declaration of Nagorno-Karabakh as part of the Armenian SSR by Armenia) are heating up the situation.

Azerbaijani refugees from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict region, 1993.

Since 1990, the conflict has escalated into a war with the use of artillery. Illegal armed groups are active. The leadership of the USSR is trying to use force (mainly against the Armenian side), but it is too late - the Soviet Union itself ceases to exist. Independent Azerbaijan declares Nagorno-Karabakh its part. NKAO proclaims independence within the borders of the autonomous region and the Shaumyan region of the Azerbaijan SSR.

The war lasted until 1994, accompanied by war crimes and heavy civilian casualties on both sides. Many cities were reduced to ruins. On the one hand, the armies of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia took part in it, on the other, the armies of Azerbaijan with the support of Muslim volunteers from around the world (Afghan Mujahideen and Chechen militants are usually mentioned). The war ended after decisive victories of the Armenian side, which established control over most of Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent regions of Azerbaijan. After this, the parties agreed to mediation by the CIS (primarily Russia). Since then, Nagorno-Karabakh has maintained a fragile peace, sometimes broken by skirmishes along the border.

The war is over, but the problem is far from resolved.

Azerbaijan firmly insists on its territorial integrity, agreeing to discuss only the autonomy of the republic. The Armenian side equally firmly insists on the independence of Karabakh. The main obstacle to constructive negotiations is the mutual bitterness of the parties. By pitting nations against each other (or at least not preventing the incitement of hatred), the authorities have fallen into a trap - now it is impossible for them to take a step towards the other side without being accused of treason.

The fourth building of the Shusha sanatorium. In 1988, this building housed the 3217 Infantry Regiment to ensure order and peace in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The depth of the gap between peoples is clearly visible in the coverage of the conflict by both sides. There is not even a hint of objectivity. The parties unanimously keep silent about pages of history that are unfavorable for themselves and immensely inflate the crimes of the enemy.

The Armenian side focuses on the historical belonging of the region to Armenia, on the illegality of the inclusion of Nagorno-Karabakh into the Azerbaijan SSR, and on the right of peoples to self-determination. The crimes of Azerbaijanis against the civilian population are depicted - such as pogroms in Sumgait, Baku, etc. At the same time, real events acquire clearly exaggerated features - such as the story of mass cannibalism in Sumgait. Azerbaijan's connection with international Islamic terrorism is rising. From the conflict, accusations shift to the structure of the Azerbaijani state in general.

The Azerbaijani side, in turn, emphasizes the long-standing ties between Karabakh and Azerbaijan (remembering the Turkic Karabakh Khanate) and the principle of the inviolability of borders. The crimes of Armenian militants are also remembered, while their own people are completely forgotten. The connection between Armenia and international Armenian terrorism is indicated. Unflattering conclusions are drawn about the world's Armenians as a whole.

In such a situation, it is extremely difficult for international mediators to act, especially considering the fact that the mediators themselves represent different world forces and act in different interests.

The main international group trying to resolve the conflict is the so-called OSCE Minsk Group, chaired by Russia, France and the United States.

In general, the group proposed a choice of three settlement plans - a package, a phased one and a comprehensive settlement plan based on the concept of a “common state”. According to the latter, “Nagorno-Karabakh is a state and territorial entity in the form of a Republic and forms a common state with Azerbaijan within its internationally recognized borders” (Quoted from A. Jilavyan, “Karabakh boom.” // “Nezavisimaya Gazeta” dated 02.23.2003). It was assumed that Nagorno-Karabakh would be given broad autonomy, including the right to direct foreign economic activity, the right to security forces (in fact, the army), its own constitution and the issue of its own banknotes. The borders of the republic were established within the NKAO, the border between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan was declared open. Karabakh's budget was to be formed from its own sources.

Such autonomy sounded suspiciously like independence, and Azerbaijan rejected the plan, while Armenia and the NKR accepted it.

The United States proposed its plan in 2006, represented by OSCE Minsk Group co-chair Matthew Bryza. It was based on the following principles:

Armenian forces leave occupied Azerbaijani territories outside the former NKAO;

Diplomatic relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan are being normalized;

International peacekeeping forces are stationed in these territories;

A referendum on independence is being held on the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Despite the apparent benefits, this plan raised many questions on the Armenian side.

Firstly, the occupied areas create a “security belt” around the NKR. They contain strategically important heights that allow them to shoot through the territory of the unrecognized republic.

Secondly, the territory of the Lachin and Kelbajar regions, which the Armenians must also leave according to Bryza’s plan, is wedged between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. By giving them away, the Karabakh Armenians risk being surrounded.

Thirdly, Armenia stimulated resettlement in the territories of these two regions. What to do with displaced people?

Fourthly, Armenians are interested in the composition of the peacekeeping forces and their real ability to keep the parties from violence.

Azerbaijanis are not satisfied with the lack of an obligation to return refugees, as well as the ambiguity in holding a referendum - will the votes of Azerbaijanis who left Karabakh as a result of the conflict be taken into account?

Thus, this plan could not reconcile the parties.

The leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan met face to face several times to discuss the problem. This happened in 2001 in Paris, and then in Key West (USA) and in 2006 in Paris (Rambouillet Castle). But even in these cases, no agreements could be reached.

Recently, there has been renewed hope for progress in resolving the conflict. Analysts attribute the increased activity of the parties to the Five-Day War in South Ossetia, which changed the balance of power in the Caucasus (primarily the role of Russia) and clearly demonstrated how “frozen” conflicts can end. Since the end of 2008, Russia has been taking measures to bring the parties together at the negotiating table. In November, Russia managed to achieve the signing of a Declaration on the Non-Use of Force at negotiations in the Moscow region. The document states the readiness of the parties “to contribute to the improvement of the situation in the South Caucasus and the establishment of an environment of stability and security in the region through a political settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on the principles and norms of international law.” An agreement was also reached to hold direct negotiations in June 2009 between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Another regional player is also showing activity - Turkey, which previously spoke from an extremely pro-Azerbaijani position. Last year, Türkiye made some contacts with the Armenian side for the first time.

Celebration of the 20th anniversary of the independence day of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic / Leadership of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia, clergy. September 2, 2011

At the same time, the parties declare their determination to defend principled positions - the integrity of Azerbaijan and the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh, respectively. Given the incompatibility of these positions, it is not very clear what the presidents will talk about in June. Perhaps this conflict will be resolved only when generations change and the intensity of hatred between peoples subsides.

After the Black January tragedy, tens of thousands of Azerbaijani communists publicly burned their party cards in the hours when a million-strong crowd in Baku followed the funeral procession. Many PFA leaders were arrested, but they were soon released and were able to continue their activities. Vezirov fled to Moscow; Ayaz Mutalibov succeeded him as party leader of Azerbaijan. Mutalibov's reign from 1990 to August 1991 was "quiet" by Azerbaijani standards. It was characterized by the “enlightened authoritarianism” of the local nomenklatura, which exchanged communist ideology for national symbols and traditions in order to strengthen its power. May 28, the anniversary of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic of 1918-1920, became a national holiday and official tribute was paid to the Islamic religion. Furman notes that the Baku intelligentsia supported Mutalibov during this period. An advisory council was established with the participation of opposition leaders, and it was with the consent of this council that Mutalibov was first elected president by the Supreme Council of Azerbaijan in the fall of 1990. Of the 360 ​​delegates, only 7 were workers, 2 collective farmers and 22 intellectuals. The rest were members of the party and state elite, directors of enterprises and law enforcement officers. The Popular Front received 31 mandates (10%), and, according to Furman, it had little chance of winning more in an environment of relative stability.

After the Black January crisis in Azerbaijan, which led to military clashes between units of the Soviet Army and units of the Popular Front in Nakhichevan, something like a compromise was reached between Mutalibov and the union leadership: communist rule is restored in Azerbaijan, but in exchange the Center provides political support to Mutalibov - for an account of Armenia and the Armenian movement in Nagorno-Karabakh. The Union leaders, in turn, sought to support Mutalibov, fearing to lose not only Georgia and Armenia, but also the entire Transcaucasus. Attitudes towards Nagorno-Karabakh became even more negative after the ANM won the elections in Armenia in the summer of 1990.

The state of emergency in Nagorno-Karabakh was actually a regime of military occupation. 157 of the 162 “passport check” operations carried out in 1990, whose true purpose was to terrorize civilians, were carried out in ethnically Armenian villages.

By the fall of 1990, after elections in all the republics of Transcaucasia, the communists retained power only in Azerbaijan. Support for the Mutalibov regime acquired even greater significance for the Kremlin, which sought to preserve the unity of the USSR (in March 1991, Azerbaijan voted to preserve the USSR). The blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh was intensified. The strategy, jointly developed by Azerbaijan and senior Soviet military-political figures (especially the future organizers of the August 1991 coup), provided for the deportation of at least part of the population from the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Okrug and adjacent Armenian villages.

The deportation operation was codenamed "Ring". It lasted four months, until the August 1991 coup. During this period, about 10 thousand people were deported from Karabakh to Armenia; Military units and riot police devastated 26 villages, killing 140-170 Armenian civilians (37 of them died in the villages of Getashen and Martunashen). Residents of Azerbaijani villages in NKAO, speaking to independent observers, also spoke about massive violations of human rights by Armenian militants. The operations of the Soviet army in Karabakh only led to the progressive demoralization of the troops themselves. They did not stop the spread of armed struggle in the region.

Nagorno-Karabakh: declaration of independence

After the failure of the August putsch in Moscow, almost all the organizers and instigators of Operation Ring lost their power and influence. In the same August, military formations in the Shaumyan (Azerbaijani name: Goranboy) region received an order to cease fire and retreat to places of permanent deployment. On August 31, the Supreme Council of Azerbaijan adopted a declaration on the restoration of the independent Republic of Azerbaijan, i.e. the one that existed in 1918-1920. For Armenians, this meant that the Soviet-era legal basis for the autonomous status of NKAO was now abolished. In response to the declaration of independence of Azerbaijan, the Karabakh side proclaimed the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR). This was done on September 2, 1991 at a joint meeting of the regional Council of the NKAO and the regional Council of the Shaumyan region populated by Armenians. The NKR was proclaimed within the borders of the former Autonomous Okrug and the Shaumyanovsky district (which was not previously part of the NKAO). On November 26, 1991, the Supreme Council of Azerbaijan adopted a law abolishing the autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh. On December 10, the Supreme Council of the NKR, consisting exclusively of representatives of the Armenian population, announced its independence and secession from Azerbaijan based on the results of a referendum held among the Armenian population. Armenian legislators have still not resolved the obvious contradiction between the declaration of independence of the NKR and the still unresolved resolution of the Supreme Council of Armenia of December 1, 1989, according to which Nagorno-Karabakh was reunited with Armenia proper. Armenia stated that it has no territorial claims against Azerbaijan. This position allows Armenia to view the conflict as a bilateral one, in which Azerbaijan and NKR are participating, while Armenia itself does not directly participate in the conflict. However, Armenia, following the same logic and for fear of worsening its own position in the world community, does not officially recognize the independence of the NKR. In recent years, debates have continued in Armenia on the topic: whether the cancellation of the “annexationist” decision of the Armenian parliament of December 1, 1989 and the official recognition of the NKR will make a full-scale war with Azerbaijan inevitable (Ter-Petrosyan), or whether such recognition will help convince the world community that that Armenia is not an aggressor country? The latter point of view, in particular, was defended in June 1993 by Suren Zolyan, secretary of the commission on Artsakh (Karabakh) of the Supreme Council of Armenia. Suren Zolyan argued that while the NKR is not recognized as a subject of international relations, full responsibility for its actions lies with Armenia, which gives some validity to the thesis of Armenian aggression. In Nagorno-Karabakh itself, a certain ambiguity about whether it should be independent, whether it should be part of Armenia, or whether it should turn to Russia with a request to be included in it is emphasized by the fact that at the end of 1991, the then chairman of the Supreme Council of the NKR G. Petrosyan sent letter to Yeltsin asking for NKR to join Russia. He did not receive an answer. On December 22, 1994, the NKR parliament elected Robert Kocharyan, who had previously been the chairman of the State Defense Committee, as NKR president until 1996.

Armenia and Azerbaijan: dynamics of the political process

In the fall of 1990, the head of the ANM Ter-Petrosyan won the general elections and became president of the republic. The ANM, unlike the Armenian opposition, seeks to prevent the republic’s direct participation in the Karabakh conflict and is trying with all its might to limit the scope of the conflict. One of the main concerns of the ANM is to establish good relations with the West. The ANM leadership is aware that Turkey is a NATO member and the main ally of the United States in the region. It recognizes reality, refrains from making claims to the lands of historical Armenia (now located in Turkey), and wants to develop Armenian-Turkish contacts.

Unlike the ANM, the Dashnaktsutyun (Armenian Revolutionary Federation) party, mainly based abroad among the Armenian diaspora, is primarily an anti-Turkish party. Currently, its efforts are focused on organizing public pressure in the West to force Turkey to formally condemn the 1915 genocide. The party has a strong position in Karabakh thanks to its image as a strong, heroic and uncompromising organization, its emphasis on military discipline, numerous connections and significant funds abroad . However, there is intense rivalry between Dashnaktsutyun and President Ter-Petrosyan. In 1992, the latter expelled the Dashnak leader Hrayr Marukhyan from Armenia; in December 1994 he suspended the party, accusing it of terrorism.

Nevertheless, the efforts of the Armenian diaspora have borne fruit. Its lobby in the US Congress in 1992 achieved the adoption of a provision banning all non-humanitarian aid to Azerbaijan until it took “demonstrable steps” to end its blockade of Armenia. In 1993, the United States allocated $195 million in aid to Armenia (Armenia is in second place, after Russia, in the list of aid recipients among all post-Soviet states); Azerbaijan received $30 million.

Seven opposition parties - including, in addition to the Dashnaks, the Union of National Self-Determination, led by former dissident Paruyr Hayrikyan, and the Ramkavar-Azatakan (liberals) - are criticizing what they see as Ter-Petrosyan's arbitrariness and arbitrariness in governing the country and the concessions made by the Armenian leadership under pressure from foreign powers and the UN (non-recognition of the NKR, agreement in principle to the withdrawal of NKR troops from the occupied ethnically Azerbaijani regions). Despite Armenia's comparative political stability, the ANM's popularity is declining, largely due to economic hardship caused by the Azerbaijani blockade. Total industrial production in the first nine months of 1993 decreased by 38% compared to the corresponding period in 1992. Everyday hardships in besieged Armenia led to mass emigration, estimated at 300-800 thousand in 1993, mainly to Southern Russia and Moscow. The wide discrepancies in the numbers of emigrants are explained by the fact that many of those leaving retained their registration in Armenia.

In Azerbaijan, the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh also determines the rise and fall of the fortunes of politicians. Until mid-1993, defeats during the war or political crises accompanying the various vicissitudes of the struggle for Karabakh led to the fall of four first secretaries of the Communist Party and presidents in a row: Bagirov, Vezirov, Mutalibov (with the interim presidency of Mamedov and Gambar in May - June 1992). ), again Mutalibov and Elchibey.

The August 1991 coup in Moscow undermined the legitimacy of President Mutalibov in Azerbaijan. During the putsch, he made a statement condemning Gorbachev and indirectly supporting the Moscow putschists. The Popular Front launched rallies and demonstrations demanding new parliamentary and presidential elections. Mutalibov urgently organized presidential elections (September 8, 1991); 85.7% of those included in the lists took part in the voting, of which 98.5% voted for Mutalibov. This result was considered by many to be rigged. The Communist Party was officially dissolved, and on October 30, the Supreme Council of Azerbaijan, under pressure from the Popular Front, was forced to transfer part of its powers to the Milli-Majlis (National Council) consisting of 50 members, half of whom were former communists and the other half from the opposition. The PFA's campaign to eliminate Mutalibov continued, with the latter blaming Russia for abandoning him to his fate. The final blow to Mutalibov came on February 26-27, 1992, when Karabakh forces captured the village of Khojaly near Stepanakert, killing many civilians. Azerbaijani sources claim that the massacre, allegedly carried out with the help of Russian troops (a fact that the Armenian side denies), led to the death of 450 people and 450 were injured. The very fact of the massacres was later confirmed, among others, by a fact-finding mission of the Moscow human rights center Memorial. On March 6, 1992, Mutalibov resigned. Soon after, ex-President Mutalibov expressed doubt about Armenian responsibility for Khojaly, hinting that some of the Azerbaijani civilians may have actually been killed by Azerbaijani forces in order to discredit him. Yagub Mamedov, chairman of the Supreme Council, became interim head of state. The election campaign was in full swing when, on May 9, 1992, news arrived of the fall of Shushi. This made it possible for the ex-communist Supreme Council to annul Mutalibov's resignation, absolving him of blame for Khojaly (May 14). The Milli Majlis was dissolved. The next day, PFA supporters stormed the Supreme Council building and seized the presidential palace, forcing Mutalibov to flee to Moscow. On May 18, the Supreme Council accepted Mamedov’s resignation, elected PFA member Isa Gambara as interim president and transferred its powers back to the Milli-Majlis, which it had abolished three days ago. In new elections held in June 1992, the leader of the Popular Front, Abulfaz Elchibey, was elected president (76.3% of those who took part in the vote; 67.9% in favor).

Elchibey promised to solve the Karabakh problem in favor of the Azerbaijanis by September 1992. The main points of the PFA program were as follows: pro-Turkish, anti-Russian orientation, defending the independence of the republic, refusal to join the CIS and speaking in favor of a possible merger with Iranian Azerbaijan (a trend that alarmed Iran). Although Elchibey's government included a large number of brilliant intellectuals who had never been part of the nomenklatura, the attempt to purge the government apparatus of old corrupt officials failed, and the new people brought to power by Elchibey found themselves isolated, and some of them became corrupt in their turn. At the beginning of May 1993, popular discontent resulted in anti-government rallies in a number of cities, including Ganja, after which many members of the opposition Milli Istiglal Party (National Independence Party) were arrested. The popularity of Heydar Aliyev, a former member of the Politburo and later head of Nakhichevan, who managed to maintain peace on the border of his autonomous region with Armenia, increased. Aliyev's New Azerbaijan Party, created in September 1992, became a focal point of the opposition, uniting a wide variety of groups - from neo-communists to members of small national parties and societies. Defeats in battle and secret Russian maneuvers directed against Elchibey led to an uprising in June 1993, led by wealthy wool factory director and field commander Suret Huseynov (hero of Azerbaijan). The latter's triumphant peaceful campaign against Baku ended with the overthrow of Elchibey and his replacement by Aliyev. Suret Huseynov became prime minister. Aliyev revised the policy of the Popular Front: he introduced Azerbaijan into the CIS, abandoned its exclusively pro-Turkish orientation, restored broken ties with Moscow and strengthened the country’s international positions (contacts with Iran, Great Britain and France). He also suppressed separatism in the south of the republic (the proclamation of Talysh autonomy by Colonel Aliakram Gumbatov in the summer of 1993).

Nevertheless, internal instability continued in Azerbaijan even after Aliyev came to power. The latter’s relationship with Suret Huseynov soon deteriorated. Aliyev removed Huseynov from negotiating oil (and therefore from appropriating future proceeds from its sale). Huseynov also appeared to oppose Aliyev's exit from the Russian orbit, which took place throughout 1994. In early October 1994, following the signing of an oil contract with a Western consortium on September 20, a coup attempt occurred in Baku and Ganja, with some of the plotters belonged to the circle of supporters of Suret Huseynov. Aliyev suppressed this coup attempt (if there was one: a number of observers in Baku describe it as an intrigue by Aliyev himself) and soon after relieved Huseynov of all duties.

Russian policy towards the conflict (August 1991 - mid-1994)

As the collapse of the USSR became a reality from August 1991 (ending in December), Russia found itself in the position of a country without a specific mission in the military conflict zone in Nagorno-Karabakh, moreover, without common borders with this zone. The end of 1991 was marked by the collapse (temporary?) of imperial ideology and the weakening of control over the army. In conflict zones in the Soviet/Russian forces, almost all decisions were made by an individual officer, at most a general. The processes that began in the army as a result of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the collapse of the USSR and Gaidar’s reforms - mass demobilization, withdrawal of troops from far and near abroad (including Azerbaijan, from where the last Russian troops were withdrawn at the end of May 1993), division of both military contingents, as well as weapons between different republics and the conversion of the military industry - all this aggravated the general chaos in conflict zones. In Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and Moldova, ex-Soviet mercenaries and filibusters appeared on both sides of the front. Under these conditions, what can be called Russian policy in the region had a random, reactive nature, which it remained until 1992-1993. the slow increase in controllability of the state apparatus has led to some restoration of Russia's ability to formulate and achieve its goals in relations with neighboring countries (although the factor of “hungry and angry” officers waging their local wars “on the edge of the former Soviet empire” still cannot be discounted ).

Since August 1991, Russian policy regarding the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh has developed in the following main directions: attempts at mediation, such as that undertaken by Boris Yeltsin and Kazakh President N. Nazarbayev in September 1991, and later participation in the work of the Minsk the CSCE group, the tripartite initiative (USA, Russia and Turkey) and the conduct of independent missions, such as the one carried out by Ambassador-at-Large V. Kazimirov in 1993 and 1994; withdrawal of Russian armed forces from the conflict zone and distribution of remaining weapons among the newly formed republics; an attempt to maintain military balance in the region and prevent third-party players (Turkey and Iran) from entering its Caucasian zone of influence. With the development of economic reforms in Russia, the economic factor began to play an increasingly important role in the country’s relations with the new republics. In 1993, Russia showed increasing interest in involving Azerbaijan and Georgia in the CIS and serving as the sole peacemaker in the former Soviet republics.

Since Russian troops in Karabakh, having lost their combat mission after August 1991, were in serious danger of demoralization, the withdrawal of Soviet internal troops from Karabakh (except for the 366th regiment in Stepanakert) began in November. In March 1992, the 366th Regiment literally fell to pieces, as part of its non-Armenian contingent deserted, and the other part, especially Armenian soldiers and officers, captured light and heavy weapons and joined the NKR units.

In the field of diplomacy, Russia tried to maintain a balance between Armenia and Azerbaijan, preventing one of the parties from achieving decisive superiority. According to a bilateral treaty of 1992, Russia pledged to protect Armenia from external (implied: Turkish) intervention, but this treaty was never ratified by the Supreme Council of Russia, which feared Russia would be drawn into the Caucasian conflicts.

According to the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty of May 15, 1992, signed by, among other countries, Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, any attack on any of the parties will be regarded as an attack on all. However, less than a month later, power in Azerbaijan passed into the hands of the pro-Turkish government of Elchibey. When threats were made against Armenia from Turkey in connection with the crisis in the Nakhichevan region in mid-May 1992, Russian Secretary of State G. Burbulis and Defense Minister P. Grachev paid a visit to Yerevan in order to discuss specific ways to implement the agreement on collective security: this was a clear signal that Russia would not leave Armenia alone. The United States issued a corresponding warning to the Turkish side, and the Russian authorities warned Armenia against invading Nakhichevan. Plans for Turkish intervention were canceled.

Another incident, in September 1993, led to a dramatic increase in Russia's role in the region. When fighting broke out again in Nakhichevan, Iranian troops entered the autonomous region to guard a jointly managed reservoir; they also entered the Goradiz point in the “continental” part of Azerbaijan, ostensibly to provide assistance to Azerbaijani refugees. According to Armen Khalatyan, an analyst at the Moscow Institute for Humanitarian-Political Studies, an appeal by the Azerbaijani authorities to Turkey for military assistance could provoke an armed conflict between Turkish and Russian units guarding the Armenian border, as well as a clash with the Iranians who had already entered Nakhichevan. Baku was thus faced with a choice: either allow the conflict to grow to uncontrollable proportions, or turn its face to Moscow. Aliyev chose the latter, thereby allowing Russia to restore its influence along the entire perimeter of the Transcaucasian border of the CIS, which effectively took Turkey and Iran out of the game.

On the other hand, condemning each subsequent seizure of even more territory by the NKR troops of Azerbaijan, Russia continued to supply Azerbaijan with weapons, while at the same time silently taking advantage of Armenian victories on the battlefield to ensure the rise to power of a government in Azerbaijan that would better listen to Russian interests ( i.e., the Aliyev government instead of the Elchibey government) - a calculation that was justified only in the short term, and not in the long term. At the end of June 1993, Aliyev suspended a deal between Baku and a consortium of eight leading Western firms (including British Petroleum, Amoco and Pennsoil) to develop three Azerbaijani oil fields. The route of the proposed oil pipeline, which was previously supposed to go to the Turkish Mediterranean coast, was now supposed to pass through Novorossiysk - at least that's what the Russians hoped. The Russian press suggested that the pipeline, if it bypassed Russia, could actually free Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and perhaps even the oil-rich Muslim republics of Russia itself from Russian influence, whereas previously the oil wealth of these regions had flowed to the world market only through Russia.

15 years ago (1994), Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia signed the Bishkek Protocol on the cessation of fire in the Karabakh conflict zone from May 12, 1994.

Nagorno-Karabakh is a region in Transcaucasia, de jure part of Azerbaijan. The population is 138 thousand people, the vast majority are Armenians. The capital is the city of Stepanakert. The population is about 50 thousand people.

According to Armenian open sources, Nagorno-Karabakh (the ancient Armenian name is Artsakh) was first mentioned in the inscription of Sardur II, king of Urartu (763-734 BC). In the early Middle Ages, Nagorno-Karabakh was part of Armenia, according to Armenian sources. After most of this country was captured by Turkey and Iran in the Middle Ages, the Armenian principalities (melikdoms) of Nagorno-Karabakh maintained a semi-independent status.

According to Azerbaijani sources, Karabakh is one of the most ancient historical regions of Azerbaijan. According to the official version, the appearance of the term “Karabakh” dates back to the 7th century and is interpreted as a combination of the Azerbaijani words “gara” (black) and “bagh” (garden). Among other provinces, Karabakh (Ganja in Azerbaijani terminology) in the 16th century. was part of the Safavid state, and later became the independent Karabakh Khanate.

According to the Kurekchay Treaty of 1805, the Karabakh Khanate, as a Muslim-Azerbaijani land, was subordinated to Russia. IN 1813 According to the Gulistan Peace Treaty, Nagorno-Karabakh became part of Russia. In the first third of the 19th century, according to the Treaty of Turkmenchay and the Treaty of Edirne, the artificial placement of Armenians resettled from Iran and Turkey in Northern Azerbaijan, including Karabakh, began.

On May 28, 1918, the independent state of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) was created in Northern Azerbaijan, retaining its political power over Karabakh. At the same time, the declared Armenian (Ararat) Republic put forward its claims to Karabakh, which were not recognized by the ADR government. In January 1919, the ADR government created the Karabakh province, which included Shusha, Javanshir, Jebrail and Zangezur districts.

IN July 1921 By decision of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), Nagorno-Karabakh was included in the Azerbaijan SSR with the rights of broad autonomy. In 1923, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Okrug was formed on the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan.

February 20, 1988 An extraordinary session of the regional Council of Deputies of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Okrug adopted a decision “On a petition to the Supreme Councils of the AzSSR and the Armenian SSR for the transfer of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Okrug from the AzSSR to the Armenian SSR.” The refusal of the Union and Azerbaijani authorities caused protest demonstrations by Armenians not only in Nagorno-Karabakh, but also in Yerevan.

On September 2, 1991, a joint session of the Nagorno-Karabakh regional and Shahumyan district councils was held in Stepanakert. At the session, a Declaration was adopted on the proclamation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic within the borders of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region, the Shahumyan region and part of the Khanlar region of the former Azerbaijan SSR.

December 10, 1991, a few days before the official collapse of the Soviet Union, a referendum was held in Nagorno-Karabakh, in which the overwhelming majority of the population, 99.89%, voted for complete independence from Azerbaijan.

Official Baku recognized this act as illegal and abolished the autonomy of Karabakh that existed during the Soviet years. Following this, an armed conflict began, during which Azerbaijan tried to hold Karabakh, and Armenian troops defended the independence of the region with the support of Yerevan and the Armenian diaspora from other countries.

During the conflict, regular Armenian units completely or partially captured seven regions that Azerbaijan considered its own. As a result, Azerbaijan lost control over Nagorno-Karabakh.

At the same time, the Armenian side believes that part of Karabakh remains under the control of Azerbaijan - the villages of the Mardakert and Martuni regions, the entire Shaumyan region and the Getashen subdistrict, as well as Nakhichevan.

In the description of the conflict, the parties provide their figures for losses, which differ from those of the opposing side. According to consolidated data, the losses of both sides during the Karabakh conflict amounted to 15 to 25 thousand people killed, more than 25 thousand wounded, hundreds of thousands of civilians fled their places of residence.

May 5, 1994 With the mediation of Russia, Kyrgyzstan and the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly in the capital of Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek, Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia signed a protocol that went down in the history of the settlement of the Karabakh conflict as the Bishkek Protocol, on the basis of which a ceasefire agreement was reached on May 12.

On May 12 of the same year, a meeting was held in Moscow between the Minister of Defense of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan (now the President of Armenia), the Minister of Defense of Azerbaijan Mammadraffi Mammadov and the commander of the NKR Defense Army Samvel Babayan, at which the parties’ commitment to the previously reached ceasefire agreement was confirmed.

The negotiation process to resolve the conflict began in 1991. September 23, 1991 A meeting of the presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Armenia took place in Zheleznovodsk. In March 1992, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group to resolve the Karabakh conflict was established, co-chaired by the United States, Russia and France. In mid-September 1993, the first meeting of representatives of Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh took place in Moscow. Around the same time, a closed meeting between the President of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev and the then Prime Minister of Nagorno-Karabakh Robert Kocharyan took place in Moscow. Since 1999, regular meetings have been held between the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Azerbaijan insists on maintaining its territorial integrity, Armenia defends the interests of the unrecognized republic, since the unrecognized NKR is not a party to the negotiations.

Background to the Armenian-Azerbaijani War. 1905

The conflict between Christian Armenians and Muslim Azerbaijanis has deep roots. There are not only religious, but also broader cultural differences. By the beginning of the 20th century, there were no clear boundaries between the Armenian and Azerbaijani territories. Everything belonged to one empire. Two peoples settled “within the territories” of another people, that is, a situation arose when, for example, first there was a settlement of Azerbaijanis, then Armenians, then again Azerbaijanis. “Inside the territories” is used in quotation marks, since these territories belonged to the Russian Empire until the end of 1917. No one simply cared about the peaceful division of lands so that everyone had their own country. As a result, land surveying is still happening, although not with such fervor. A typical story in the territories of former colonies: “efficiency” is important to the empire, not the lives of the people. Here it is appropriate to recall to some extent the Middle East: inadequate borders as a symbol of the “effective management” of the empire. Further - more similarities.

Cossack patrol near burned oil fields in Baku, 1905

The first clashes in the 20th century occurred just when the imperial center wavered - in 1905. In February 1905, massacres took place in Baku and Nakhichevan (territory bordering present-day Armenia). Then a rumor spread in Baku teahouses that the Armenians wanted to attack Muslims on a Shiite holiday, and any funerals of victims of contract killings turned into demonstrations. The situation was tense. Then a group of Armenians shot an Azerbaijani worker. It was then that pogroms broke out.

The beginnings of the conflict at the end of the 19th century

If we delve further into prehistory, we will find several reasons for the conflict in the last decades of the 19th century. After Russia annexed Transcaucasia, the empire applied the same practices to these territories as to its European possessions. In particular, non-Christians could occupy no more than a third of the seats in local governments. Initially, this measure was directed against Jews, but in Transcaucasia it turned against Muslims. As a result, the majority of seats in the assemblies were occupied by Armenians.

Further, the Russian Empire tried to rely on the Armenians as conductors of its power in the region (Christians). However, this only developed a sense of exclusivity among the Armenian nobility, which went against the goals of the empire. More and more Armenians remember the great Armenian kingdom. They will not only think about him more often, but also write about him when the governor and politics in Transcaucasia change. Grigory Golitsyn, appointed in 1886, will support Muslims: he will greatly reduce the number of Armenian officials, and Azerbaijanis will take their place. Golitsyn will see the Armenians as a danger, since they are the same Jews - this is what was written in the reports to St. Petersburg. Armenian schools will be closed, children will receive education according to the Russian model, the history and geography of Armenia will be excluded from school curricula. Armenian nationalists, in particular the Dashnaktsutyun party, will take the path of terror.

It is noteworthy that representatives of the empire were generally inactive. The Bolsheviks later saw the reason for the massacre in the fact that the imperial authorities deliberately pitted the more loyal Muslim Azerbaijani population against the revolutionary-minded Armenian population.

Armenian-Azerbaijani war 1918−1920

Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1919-1920

As already noted, the history around the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is reminiscent of how they fought in the Middle East. Only in smaller spaces, very close and no less confusing. Azerbaijan sought to reach the borders of friendly Turkey and take the territories inhabited by Azerbaijanis under its control. The main actions took place in Karabakh, Zangezur and Nakhichevan. Everything is in the direction from Azerbaijan to the border with Turkey. The Armenians also wanted to take control of all territories inhabited by Armenians.

Azerbaijani artilleryman in Karabakh

During the war, the mutual hatred of neighbors reached such an extent that both sides destroyed enemy settlements. The terrain in the war zones, according to the testimony of foreigners, was not just depopulated - there was simply nothing left there. Both sides expelled enemy peoples, shot, destroyed villages, and turned the resulting territories into purely Armenian or Azerbaijani territories.

The territories inhabited by Armenians in Azerbaijan were deserted or were inhabited by Azerbaijanis and Kurds. In the Shemakha district, 17 thousand Armenians were killed in 24 villages, in the Nukha district - 20 thousand Armenians in 20 villages. A similar picture was observed in Agdam and Ganja. In Armenia, areas inhabited by Azerbaijanis were also left without their original inhabitants. Dashnaks, members of the Dashnaktsutyun party and controlled troops, “cleared” the Novobayazet, Erivan, Echmiadzin and Sharuro-Daralagez districts of Azerbaijanis.

Karabakh Armistice Commission, 1918

The Entente is doing something (the Bolsheviks won)

Due to the inaction, for obvious reasons, of the Russian authorities in this direction, the British and Americans became involved in resolving the situation around the conflict at the very borders of the Ottoman Empire. And at first everything went favorably for the Armenians, they even called the British allies. The winners of the Great War were able to recapture Western Armenia on paper - in 1920 the Treaty of Sèvres was signed, denoting the division of Turkey. The implementation of the documents was prevented by the coming to power of the Kemalists in Turkey. They did not ratify the agreement signed by the Sultan's government.

British in Baku

In addition to the Treaty of Sèvres and the Paris Conference that took place a year before Sèvres (where, for example, the United States was given a mandate for the Transcaucasus in the spirit of those established in the Middle East), it should be noted the constant mediation of the British in the negotiations, their attempts to reconcile the parties. But, apparently, due to some goals in Paris, the British pursued a more pro-Azerbaijani policy, which aroused the indignation of the Armenians. The latter considered themselves a “little ally” of Britain. In general, the efforts of the Entente to establish peace in the region were in vain. And not even because the Bolsheviks came and pacified everyone with the power of the Red Army. It’s just that, apparently, such deep hatred is not smoothed over by papers and diplomats. This is still visible today.